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The Influence of Arms Imports on 
Third World Debt 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
The debt crisis facing many developing countries has attracted much 
attention in recent years. In large part, most of the analysis of Third 
World debt has focused on the methods used to finance the rapid rate 
of increase in external debt and the capacity of the developing countries 
to service the debt. 1 Few studies, however, have attempted to define 
the motives for debt accumulation, other than, for example, to point to 
the obvious need to finance current account deficits resulting from the 
oil price shocks. 2 An increasing suspicion among some analysts is that a 
large proportion of existing Third World debt was contracted for the pur-
pose of financing stepped-up levels of military expenditure, in general, 
and arms imports, in particular. Analysts stressing the link between arms 
imports and Third World debt note that these two patterns represent 
more than just ~ coincidence. Further substantiation of the link between 
arms transfers and public external debt is found in the fact that arms 
purchases grew in importance during the 1970s as the two major arms 
donors switched their policy from one. of gifts to one of sales. 
Despite the rather logical assertion that considerable amounts of Third 
World indebtedness have stemmed from arms imports, little empirical 
testing of the link between arms imports and Third World debt has been 
done. Nor has there been any empirical work determining whether the 
link between arms imports and external debt is universal throughout the 
Third World, or rather is confined to a smaller subgroup of Third World 
countries. 
The main purpose of the analysis that follows is to determine the role 
played by military expenditures in general and arms imports in particular 
in affecting the level of Third World debt. A secondary objective is to 
determine which groups of developing countries were most inclined to 
finance arms imports with increased external indebtedness. 
Patterns of Arms Transfers and External Indebtedness 
According to SIPRI, weapons imports hy LDCs rose from approxi-
rnatclv US$1.56 billion in W6.5 to ahout ~10.45 hillion in 1980-all in 
co11st;~11t 1975 prices. This trend alSo coincided with the rapid overall 
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buildup of Third World deht. On the other hand, arms imports declined 
to approximately $9.55 billion in 1983 and $7.82 billion in HJ84, a period 
characterized hy increased reluctance on the part of international lenders 
to increase their Third World exposures.~ 
Brzoska provides tlw only attempt to calculate the extent and contri-
bution of LDC debt attributable to the military.~ According to his esti-
mates, by the late 1970s, the net transfer of debt would be about 20 to 
30 percent less if debt-financed weapons imports had been absent. 
Weapons purchased with scarce foreign exchange have an obvious allo-
cation cost in terms of reduced resources available for the import of 
intermediate and investment goods essential for self-sustaining growth. 
It is, of course, true that a reduction in military imports would not nec-
essarily imply an equivalent increase in investment, for some leakage in 
terms of consumption or other imports could occur. There can be little 
doubt, however, that lower defense imports would improve the situation 
in terms of foreign exchange scarcity. 5 
Clearlv, whether or not Third World countries have reduced their bor-
rowing proportionally to the amount spent on.arms imports is quite con-
jectural. In fact, Sjaastad6 has convincingly shown that, given the generally 
negative rates of interest prevailing throughout most of the 1970s, Third 
World countries had an incentive to borrow as much as banks were will-
ing to lend: 
The great build-up of private international lending that occurred during the 1970s and 
earlv 1980s and was closely related to, if not a consequence of, the oil J>rice increases 
produced a virtual explosion of liquidity in the international commercial hanks. Perhaps 
because of unanticipated inflation, and in part due to the OPEC surpluses following the 
oil price increases of 1973-74, real rates of interest on dollar-denominated external debt 
were very low and, indeed, they were frequently negative, giving the developing mun-
tries a rather strong incentive to incur that debt. When real rates of interest are negative 
(and expected to remain so) it is clearly impossible to have .. too much .. external debt.' 
While Brzoska has, therefore, made a convincing argument as to the 
potential reduction in Third World debt that a moratorium on arms 
transfers could have produced, it is by no means obvious that Third World 
debt would have been lower in the absence of arms imports. 
The Economic Environment 
As a first step in the analysis of Third World debt, countries were split 
into two groups based on their relative foreign exchange positions. There 
is a growing body of literature suggesting that a number of governmental 
budgetary patterns reflect the relative degree of foreign exchange scarci-
ty faced by policymakers. Here foreign exchange scarcity is seen as a 
multidimensional factor, not easily characterized by one simple index such 
as a country's holdings of international reserves. 8 Research on the impact 
of military expenditures on growth has indicated that general groupings 
of countries on the basis of their overall degree of resource scarcity can 
he useful in identifying contrasting governmental expenditure patterns in 
the Third World. !I . 
Prcsumahly. all things !winµ; equal, those eountrics having either more 
domestic resources (savings and investment) or µ;n·atcr access to foreign 
. . .. 
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those countries with a low<·r level of domestic resources or less access 
to international capital will not have as high a level of arms imports. 
Usin" factor analvsis on a laq.';<' group of World Bank variables depict-
,.., . . l . I fl IO ing government deht, export and import patterns, an< capita ows, 
the main trends in the data were identified and a discriminant analysis 
wa~ then performed using as variables those with the highest loading on 
each of the individual factors. 11 The orthogonal rotation assures that each 
variable selected had a relatively low degree of correlation with the oth-
ers in the sample. The variables thus selected for splitting the countries 
into two groups on the basis of relative foreign exchange scarcity were 
as follows: 
l. Gross inflow of public loans/exports, 1982 
2. Total public external debt, 1982 
3. Gross international reserves, 1982 
4. Public external debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), 
1982 
5. Growth in imports, 1970-82 
6. External debt service as a percentage of GDP, 1982 
7. Public external debt as a percentage of GDP, 1970 
The results of the discriminant analysis (see table 1) show a high 
degree of probability of correct placement in each group, i.e., the dis-
criminating variables selected from the factor analysis are able to split 
the sample countries into two fairly distinct groupings based largely on 
the external debt situation facing each set of countries. The Group II 
countries consist of several major oil exporters and several of the more 
dynamic newlv industrializing nations such as Mexico, Greece, India, 
Korea, Spain, Algeria, and Malaysia. 12 Group I countries, which are heavily 
weighted with African and poorer Latin American countries, in general 
seem to be the more impoverished, less economically dynamic nations. 
Further insight into the two groups can he gained by examining the 
means of the variables used in the discriminant analysis: 
l. The Group I countries resorted to a much higher (3.6 times) inflow 
of external public loans in 1982 relative to their exports that year; 
2. On the other hand, the overall level of total public external debt 
in 1982 averaged nearly 4.5 times as much for Group II countries 
as is the case for Group I countries; 
3. The level of international reserves is also much higher for Group 
II countries-nearly 10 times as much as the average for Group I 
countries; 
4. With regard to shares of debt in gross domestic product, however, 
Group I countries have much higher levels, averaging nearly twice 
as .much as Group II countries in both 1970 and 1982, and the 
Group I debt service ratio to exports is correspondingly higher; 
5. The rate of growth of imports was nearly 10 times higher over the 
1970-82 period for Group II countries. 
In terms of other indices, the Group II countries arc considerably 
lan!cr. more aHlucnt (in terms of ner canita income). and less reliant on 
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large amounts on military activities, but not necessarily a significantly 
greater amount of their overall budgets. Given fewer constraints, the 
Group II countries should have a relatively easier time in attaining some 
optimal balance between arms imports, total military expenditures, and 
the level of personnel (armed forces). 
A Model of Military Expenditures, Arms Exports, and External Public 
Debt 
Using the groupings of countries previously outlined, the three-equation 
model presented later attempts to extend Brzoska's analysis by focusing 
On the interrelationshin between lllilitarv ('Xl)<'tl<lit11r1•<.: :>rnH i•nnnrk ""') 
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residents, repayable in fo1·eign cu1Tency, and having a maturity of over 
one year). 13 
Detenninants of External Public Debt. In selecting variables respon-
sible fo1· the volume of public external debt, it is reasonable as a first 
step to assume that country size will have a direct relationship to both 
the amount of external indebtedness and the individual country's capac-
ity to service this debt. 
Clearly, a large country as measured by gross national product (GNP) 
will, ceteris paribus, have more financial and commercial relations with 
the rest of the world economy and, therefore, will be more likely to 
accumulate a larger debt volume than a small country. At the same time, 
due to the diversity of output and resource base, the debt-servicing 
capacity of a large country is apt to be greater than that of a small coun-
try (and, consequently, a larger external debt can be accumulated). In 
general, we postulate that the larger the LDC economy as measured by 
its GNP, the greater its demand for external indebtedness. 
Second, a country's external debt should, in general, be related to its 
general volume of merchandise imports. For LDCs, the volume of mer-
chandise imports often tends to have a direct relationship to the coun-
try's GNP, thus providing an additional source of demand for debt. Since 
in a growing economy a share of imports will have to be financed, a 
country's indebtedness will be higher as total imports increase. 
Third, an LDC with a greater export volume will be able to service 
a larger amount of foreign debt. As is well known, export volume is often 
used by lending institutions as a key indicator of debt-service capacity. 
For practical purposes, it is safe to assume that a lender's willingness to 
supply debt varies directly with a country's exports. This relationship is 
particularly important as it relates directly to the export financing of the 
country. For most developing countries, export financing is done in for-
eign currency since most of the exports are denominated in foreign cur-
rency as well. In short, we would expect a positive relationship between 
country debt and volume of merchandise exports. 
Fourth, international reserve holdings may be another important factor 
in affecting the volume of a country's external debt. Here the relation-
ship is likely to be more complex. Logically, as a country's reserves 
increase, its ability to service a growing external debt and, hence, its 
creditworthiness should also increase. On the other hand, all else being 
equal, .one might expect that the larger a country's external revenues, 
the less pressing the need for additional debt to finance imports. There-
fore, possession of a large volume of international reserves may result in 
a larger or smaller volume of external debt. 
Finally, three types of governmental expenditures-military, health, 
and education-are introduced as independent variables in the demand 
for external debt, i.e., for political or social reasons these expenditures 
have a high import component and, therefore, may he major elements 
in accounting for the volume of external public debt over and above the 
other demand variables noted earlier. 14 
Clearly, because of the high correlation between the independent vari-
ables previously defined. it is not nossihlt> to <IPtt>rminP thrrnurh n•<tr••"-
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milit;u-v expenditures. Cive11 this constraint, the following an_alysis attcm!Jts 
to ans~er the question of whether military expenditures (a_lter controllm~ 
for GDP. imports, reserves, etc.) have signilic:111tly_ contnhuted to LDC 
external indebtedness and, if so, what type of cnv1ronm_c_nts ha:e be~n 
most conducive to external borrowing for the purpose of mereasmg m1l-
itarv expenditures. 
'fhe next step in the analysis is to isolate the main supply and demand 
influences on Third World indebtedness by deriving an equation that is 
capable of measuring the influence of all independent variables 
simultaneously. . . 
In the sp<.->ciflcation, gross national product (GNP~, t~~ pnnc1pal _demand 
variable, is followed by total imports (TI) and the md1v1dual pub~1c sect~I 
expenditures-military expenditures (ME), health \H),. and educatmn (E). 
On the supply side, the main variables are foreign reserves (GIRB) 
and total exports (TE). Notationally: 
a) Total debt (PDB) supply = fl (reserves), and . . . 
b) Total debt (PDB) demand = f2 (GNP, jmpo:ts, military expendi-
tures education expenditures, health expenditures) 
c) Totai' debt (supply) = total debt (demand) and, dividing ec~uati01~s 
(a) and (b) by the equilibrium level of total debt as specified m 
equation (c), we obtain equation (d) 
d) fl (total debt) = f2 (total debt); expressing equation (d), we can 
write 
e) xl lf l (total debt), f2 (total debt)] = 0 o~ . . .•. 
f) x2 (total debt, GDP, imports, reserv~s, n11h~ary e_xpe~d1tmes.' 
cational expenditures, health expenditures, 1mp01 ts) - 0, or. 
g) Public External Debt (PDB) 
PDB =[GNP(+). Tl(+), GIRB (-c, ?uc). ME (+c. ?uc). II(?), E (?)} 
where c = constrained and 
uc = unconstrained 
e<lu-
(I) 
Factors Affecting Arms Imports. Logically, arms imports should b.e 
related to the overall ability of the country to purchase weapons. This 
effective demand for weapons can be proxied by either military e~pen­
<litures (ME) or the general level of central government e~pend1tures 
(GEC). The composition of military forces as between eqmpment ai~d 
troops .(AF) together with the ability to subs~it_ute one for the other _will 
also condition the incentive to import additional weapons-especially 
during times of severe foreign exchange scarcity. . 
To test the hypothesis that the constrained (Group I) countnes financed 
a large proportion of their military. expenditures _with publi~ extern~! 
indebtedness, we hypothesize that for the constramed countries public 
external debt (PDB) would have a positive sign when regressed on arms. 
imports, while unconstrained countries, given alter~1ative sources of 
funding, should not experience a particularly strong lrnk between arms 
imports an<l public external ~lebt. 
Several other structural factors were also considered significant in 
.. fJ" .... ,. ... ~ ..... ..r ,,_ •. ,,,,._. ~...,,,,, 1 ,...,fc.• l.4u1-•r,1f-J"l.intJ' 1~Jc111 111o1t1l!l) \.Uh,11 thPI" f\r nnt tht,,, l"(lllll-
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arms imports. For purposes of analysis producer and 11onproducer coun-
tries were classified according to Ncuman's definition of arms producers 
as countries capable of producing at least one major weapon system. rn 
Arms producers should have higher levels of technical and industrial 
capabilities relative to those countries lacking an indigenous arms indus-
try. Furthermore, the linkages between military expenditures and the 
economy, together with the import component of military equipment 
associated with a given level of military expenditures, should be consid-
erably different for arms and nonarms producers. In general, we would 
imagine the nonarms producers to be much more reliant on imports of 
military equipment to meet a given level of defense expenditures and, 
furthermore, given the high cost of sophisticated imported weaponry, we 
would expect a high proportion of it (everything else equal) to be financed 
by external debt. Given their relative flexibility to expand weapons pro-
. duction, countries that are both arms producers and resource uncon-
strained should experience over time the greatest reduction in arms 
imports. Finally, to the extent that Third World countries produce their 
own weapons systems, we would expect a looser relationship to exist 
between arms imports and overall public external indebtedness; that is, 
equipment can be obtained from local sources in addition to imports, 
with added domestic inputs occurring when the country's creditworthi-
ness might be placed in jeopardy by additional external borrowing to 
finance arms acquisitions. 
Since data on the actual value of arms output in Third World countries 
is not available, the affect of arms production on arms imports was esti-
mated by creating a dummy variable (PRODUCE) with values of 0 for 
the countries not having an indigenous arms industry and I for those 
possessing such an industry. The expected sign of this variable is neg-
ative in the regression equation, that is, everything else equal, indige-
nous arms production should reduce the need for imported arms. 
Political/security factors were introduced by utilizing Rothstein's clas-
sification of countries based on political/security and resource-constraint 
considerations. 17 Those countries having a high level of internal and/or 
external threat combined with a low level of governmental legitimacy 
and effectiveness were assigned a value of 1 (CONFLICT = 1) and those 
having a high level of governmental legitimacy and facing relatively low 
internal and/or external threats were assigned a value of 0 (CONFLICT 
= 0). ·Rothstein has shown that countries with a high level of conflict 
tend to spend a much higher proportion of their budgets on defense. 
Clearly, everything else being equal, we would expect the high-threat 
countries to import more arms than their low-threat counterparts. 18 In 
sum, the "need" for weapons (CONFLICT), together with the ability to 
purchase ~nd/or substitute local resources, will determine the general 
range of arms imports. 
Arms Imports (AI) 
Al= [ME(+), PDH (+c. ?11c). PRODUCF. euc, +c), AF (-c, 'foe), CONFUCT(+)] (2) 
where c = resource-constrained countries and 
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·.re ·tssumed to he largely a function of the level of armed forc~s. per-. ~om:~j (AF), the overall size of the cc01.10my (GNP), an7 the. aj'~'t\i°~ 
countries to finance added expenditures Ill the short rrn prox1e d'~ le 
level of gross international reserves-GIRB). Since mi itary expe~el~;:~~~ 
have a high priority in most countries, we would ex~lect so~e ·1·t· 
shi between past external debt and levels of allocation to t e m1 '.'1ryd 
Thfs pattern is likely to be more pronounced i~ the resource-constrame 
countries given their lack of alter~ativ~. financmg.d. b financed 
In the short run some increases m nuhtary expen itures ~n e . 
t d fi ·ts (GDB-revenues minus expenditures). Agam, from governmen e ici . l"k l 
for reasons noted earlier the resource-constrained countnes are more i e y 
to be forced to resort to this type of financing for increased levels of 
defense expenditures: 
Military Expenditures (ME) 
ME= [AF(+), GNP(+), GIRB (+), PDBL (+c, ?, uc), GDB (-c, ?uc)) (3) 
Results 
· ffi · ts19 are in standardized form to facilitate a direct The regression coe cien . 20 h l t 
com arison of the relative strength of each ~ariable. T e two-~tage eas 
squ!es estimates with standardized coefficients are as follows. 
Public External Debt (PDB) 
Total sample 
PDB = 0.64 GNP+ 0.54 Tl - 0.20 GIRB - 0.04 ME - 0.08 E + 0.11 H 
(3.41) (5.54) (-2.60) (-0.65) (-0.35) (1.07) 
r = 0.947; F = 77.9 
Resource-constrained countries 
(4a) PDB = 0.07 GNP+ 0.48 TI - 0.12 GIRB + 0.40 ME + 0.67 E - 0.61 H (1.16) (2.63) (-1.31) (3.64) (4.58) (-4.48) 
r = 0.968; F = 76.0 
Resource-unconstrained countries 
(4b) PDB = 1.04 GNP+ 0.44 Tl - 0.01 GIRB - 0.14 ME - 0.41 E + 0.02 H (6.58) (7.75) (-0.24) (-2.94) (-2.25) (0.22) 
r = 0.993; F = 99.4 
\rms Imports (AI) 
Total sample 
AI = -0.24 PRODUCE +. 1.12 ME - 0.19 PDB - 0.19 AF - 0.5 CONFLICT 
(-1.47) (5.11) (-1.33) (-0.95) (-1.24) 
r 2 = 0.648; F = 9.92 
Resource-constrained countries 
Sa Al= -0.05 PRODUCE+ 0.81 ME+ 0.35 PDB - 0.21 AF+ 0.01 CONFUCT 
( ) (-2.06) (15.69) (6.31) (-6.34) (0.61) 
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Total Military Expenditures (ME) 
Total sample 
ME= 0.47 PDBL + 0.34 GIRB + 0.70AF - 0.23 GNP - 0.53 GDB (6) 
(I.73) (2.87) (6.59) (-2.64) (-l.92) 
r 2 = 0.801; F = 21. 7 
Resource-constrained countries 
(6a) ME = 0.53 PDBL + 0.42 GIRB + 0.19 AF - 0.07 GNP - 0.26 GDB 
(2.93) (3.76) (l.01) (-0.59) (-2.25) 
r 2 = 0.912; F = 33.9 
Resource-unconstrained countries 
(6b) ME= 0.01 PDBL + 0.04 GIRB + 0.89AF - 0.11 GNP- 0.09 GDB 
(0.01) (0.17) (3.53) (-0.13) (-0.33) 
r 2 = 0.735; F = 2.8 
Interpretation of the Results 
The results show several interesting patterns. We note the following 
in particular: 
I. The regression results for the sample as a whole indicate, as expected, 
the relative importance of gross national product, imports, and 
international reserves. The negative sign on international reserves 
(GIRB) indicates that countries with high reserves tend to receive 
less external funds. This suggests that a country in a relatively com-
fortable financial position, as evidenced by high reserve holdings, 
is less likely to have to incur external indebtedness. 
2. On the other hand, military expenditures (ME), education (E), and 
health expenditures (H) all appear to have had an insignificant impact 
on Third World debt. 
3. The results change dramatically when resource-constrained and 
-unconstrained countries are examined as subgroupings. Here mil-
itary expenditures have been a factor in contributing to the overall 
debt position of the constrained countries, but not the unconstrained. 
4. Both constrained and unconstrained countries were, ceteris paribus, 
able to reduce their overall level of arms imports through the indig-
enous production of arms, but perhaps because of their relative access 
to foreign exchange, the unconstrained countries were able to expand 
domestic production to a greater extent, thus replacing a larger vol-
ume of imports. 
5. The high statistical significance and negative sign for armed forces 
in the resource-constrained countries (but not in the unconstrained 
countries-Sa vs. Sb) suggests that foreign exchange shortage has 
forced large groups of countries to substitute personnel for imported 
equipment. 
6. As might be anticipated, unconstrained countries are more able to 
reach an optimal mix between armed forces and total military 
expenditures (as evidenced by the positive statistical significance of 
AF in equation 6b, but not in 6a). 
Conclusions 
debt. Jn general, the results presented above indicat~ that the answer. 
is no b11 t that for certain LDCs it is likely that a high percentage ol 
tiw e~ternal public debt acc11 mulated by 1982 was the result of expanded 
arms imports in the 1970s and early 1980s~ . . . 
WI ·it is the best characteri:t ..ation of LDCs that have relied on pul~hc extcr;~al indebtedness to finance arms imports? Based on the regrcss1~n 
I ·t . ·s that tl1e resource-constrained LDCs best characterize resu ts, 1 appeai . . •<l · I· r, 
Third World countries whose external l?ubhc d~bt has been use 1~ ,ug~ 
part to fund increased military spendmg. This ~act, together. W1th. the 
II "unproductive" nature of military expenditures, makes 1t unlikely genera y b . · · t · 'fi 
that this group of countries as a whole will e_ m a pos1hon o _s1gm .1-
cantly expand military expenditure~. At _b~st, this ?roup of countnes will 
be lucky to be able to service their ex1stmg pu~hc debt. . 
Finally, it appears likely that arms imports will_ not soon agam reach 
levels attained in the late 1970s. This situation will result not s~ ~uch 
from a general spirit of restraint on the part of suppliers and rec1p1;n~, 
but more from a lack of foreign exchange on the part of many o ~ e 
Third World countries, and the development•of indigenous production 
capabilities on the part of others. 
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